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The Mexican Economic Crisis of 1982
and the Brazilian Economic Crisis of 1999:
Critical Junctures in Economic Policy?
Ana Ligia Haro Maza / John Hogan
(Dublin Institute of Technology)∗
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. The Characteristics and Uses of the Critical Junctures
Approach
Ⅲ. The Countries Selected for Examination
Ⅳ. Policy Change and Identification
Ⅳ.1. Testing for a Macroeconomic Crisis
Ⅳ.2. Testing for Ideational Change
Ⅳ.3. Identification of Policy Change
Ⅴ. Conclusion

I. Introduction
Crises are often blamed for bringing about abrupt institutional/policy
changes (Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2000; Gorges 2001). Crises are seen
as providing political leaders with the opportunity to implement new
∗ 아나 리히아 아로 마사(Dublin Institute of Technology, lin.ana.ligia@gmail.com) / 존
호건(Corresponding Author, Dublin Institute of Technology, John.hogan@dit.ie),
“1982년 멕시코 경제 위기와 1999년 브라질 경제 위기 ‒ 경제정책의 결정적 전환점? ”
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plans. The result is a tendency to link economic crises with radical
institutional/policy changes. However, this fails to take account of, nor
does it attempt to understand, those instances where an economic crisis,
instead of being followed by radical policy change, is followed by
extant policy continuity. Blaming crises for radical policy change misses
subtleties at the heart of the process.
Despite the importance applied to critical junctures in our perception
of change, our understanding of the concept is limited due to the limited
attention that has been paid to it (Pierson 2004). Critical junctures have
been examined using unwieldy frameworks (Collier and Collier 1991;
Mohoney 2001), counterfactual analysis (Fearon 1996), and case
specific criteria (Hogan 2005; 2006). This has restricted our ability to
identify and compare critical junctures, and to differentiate them from
other forms of change, such as incremental change, that over decades
might transform a policy or institution.
Just because a crisis comes before a radical policy change does not
indicate a cause and effect relationship, which scholars (Thelen and
Steinmo 1992; Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2000; Gorges 2001) have
sometimes assumed. The critical juncture framework developed by
Hogan and Doyle (2007; 2008) contends that such a linkage is an
oversimplification, failing to take account of the specific circumstances
involved. It argues that an economic crisis is a necessary, but
insufficient, condition for radical economic policy change. According to
the framework, a critical juncture consists of crisis, ideational change,
and radical policy change. The framework rests upon the hypothesis that
a crisis induced consolidation of a new idea –replacing an extant idea–
leads to significant policy change. Thus, the framework should be
capable of explaining why certain crises lead to critical junctures in
policies, whereas others do not, as the differentiating factor between
them is ideational change. The framework contends that without
ideational change the level of policy change, in response to a crisis, can
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maccroeconomic difficulties affecting
a
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ng this frameework. Our objective is to discover if the economic
diffiiculties affeccting both co
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hanges in the ideas underrpinning theirr macroeconomic
policies, and the
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subsequ
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1) Boorrows from Halll’s (1993) conceept of first, second and third ordder change.
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II. The Characteristics and Uses of the Critical Junctures Approach
Critical junctures are seen as branching points that set processes
change in motion. The literature sees critical junctures resulting in the
adoption of an institutional arrangement from among alternatives
(Mahoney 2000, 512). Thereafter, the pathway established funnels units
in a particular direction (Mahoney 2003, 53).
For some, a critical juncture constitutes a brief period in which one direction
or another is taken, while for others, it is an extended period of reorientation
(Mahoney 2001). The concept has been employed in comparative politics.
Collier and Collier (1991) used a critical juncture framework in their analyses of
labour movements in Latin America. Mahoney (2001) employed a similar
framework examining the liberalisation of Central America. For Collier and
Collier (1991) and Mahoney (2001) critical junctures took decades to occur.
Hogan (2005; 2006) questioned whether these periods were instances of
incremental change, labeled by Streeck and Thelen (2005) periods of
conversion.
In relation to short term change, Garrett and Lange (1995, 628)
showed that electoral landslides created critical junctures by producing
mandates for policy change. Casper and Taylor (1996) employed the
concept in analysing liberalisation of authoritarian regimes, while
Hogan’s (2005; 2006) remoulded the framework to examine change in
trade union influence over public policy. Karl (1997) employed the
concept of critical junctures in analyzing how “petro-states” became
locked into problematic development pathways, while Gal and Bargal
(2002) used critical junctures to analyze occupational welfare in Israel.
Flockhart (2005) used critical junctures to explain the gap between
Danish voters and their politician’s attitudes towards the European
Union (EU).
The literature is inconsistent in how it quantifies, and differentiates,
critical juncutres from other forms of change. However, the fact that
Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) framework is rigorous may resolve
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this. It should produce consistent findings, enabling us to determine
whether the changes to Mexican and Brazilian economic policy
constituted critical junctures.

III. The Countries Selected for Examination
Through studying politics on a comparative basis we can discover
trends, and achieve an understanding of broader characteristics (Blondel
1995, 3). The value of comparison is the perspective it offers, and its
goal of building a body of increasingly complete explanatory theory
(Mahler 1995). Comparative historical analyses, concerning different
time periods, is also beneficial (Lieberman 2001, 5). To provide
different, but comparable cases, we draw our case selections from two
countries, separated by two decades.
Mexico in (1981-1983), and Brazil (1999-2003), are examined based
upon the criteria of “most similar” and “most different”. The selection
requirements for “most similar” are that both countries are Latin
America states, in the time periods examined are democratic, and are
presidential federal republics. Both countries’ economies are amongst
the world’s largest. In terms of differences, Brazil was colonised by the
Portuguese, while Mexico was colonised by the Spanish, giving them
different cultural heritages. Brazil is almost 5 times the size of Mexico,
has twice the population, but has a shorter history as a democracy. In the
early 1980s Mexico had import substitution policies (Panizza 2005),
while by the late 1990s Brazil was operating a free market approach
(Panizza 2005). Their similarities will ensure ‘the contexts of analysis
are analytically equivalent, to a significant degree’, while their
differences will place the ‘parallel processes of change in sharp relief’
(Collier 1997, 4).
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IV. Policy Change and Identification
Policy change must be seen in the context of societal and political
change. Utilizing Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) framework, we
examine macroeconomic policy change in discrete stages. The first
examines the economy to see if it was in crisis. A crisis implies
prevailing policy cannot be sustained without deterioration (Haggard
and Kaufman 1995, 14). To test for economic crisis we develop
observable implications. The framework’s second stage tests for
ideational change. New ideas can change the policy environment
(Pemberton 2000, 790). But, how ideas influence policy is something
theorists have long grappled with (Taylor 1993). Where do ideas come
from? How do they relate to failing policies? Why do ideas underlying a
failing policy sometimes change, resulting in policy change, whereas
other times they remain unaltered? To answer this, a second set of
observables, based on Legro (2000), are set out. The framework’s third
stage tests for policy change. These observables are based upon Hall
(1993), tying together the concepts of policy change, societal learning,
and the state.
Ⅳ.1. Testing for a Macroeconomic Crisis
Scholars regularly ‘agree that severe recessions make significant
structural changes possible as they render politics highly fluid’ (Garrett
1993, 522). However, economic crises are rare, rendering definition
difficult (Yu et al. 2006, 439). How do we identify a crisis? For Stone
(1989, 299) a situation does not become a problem until it is controllable.
But, it is controllable it must be measurable, otherwise how would we
know if we are controlling it? Thus, even economic crises must be
quantifiable.
Berg and Pattillo (1999) advocated examining individual variables when
quantifying currency crises. Pei and Adesnik (2000, 138-139) developed a
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range of criteria for identifying macroeconomic crises: annual inflation
greater than 15 percent, stagnant gross domestic product (GDP), and
historians and other analysts’ descriptions of deterioration in economic
circumstances. Frankel and Rose (1996, 351) define a “macroeconomic
crisis” as a stagnant economy, where investment is in decline, inflation,
interest rates, and unemployment are above 15 percent, and actors
perceive an economic crisis. For Solimano (2005, 76) a macro-economic
crisis can be identified through indicators and perceptions of growth,
inflation, employment creation, and poverty.
We seek to identify macro-economic crises through quantitative and
qualitative measures. Defining anything as a crisis, including a macroeconomic downturn, requires subjective and objective deliberations (Pei
and Adesnik 2000, 139). Consequently, González (2005, 93) suggests
adopting a multifaceted approach. Agents must diagnose, and impose on
others, their notion of a crisis before collective action to resolve
uncertainty can take meaningful form (Blyth 2002, 9).
We use a range of observable implications which seek to identify
change in nominal economic performance, as well as in perceptions of
economic health (Hogan and Doyle 2007; 2008).
01. If GDP growth was stagnant/negative, the economy may have
been in crisis.
02. If debt as a percentage of GNI was above 100 percent, the
economy may have been in crisis.
03. If inflation was above 15 percent (Pei and Adesnik 2000), the
economy may have been in crisis.
04. If the interest rate was above 15 percent, the economy may have
been in crisis.
05. If unemployment was above 15 percent, the economy may have
been in crisis.
06. If opinion polls find the public regard the economic in crisis, the
economy may have been in crisis.
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07. If the media regarded the economy in crisis, the economy may
have been in crisis.
08. If economic and political commentators regarded the economy in
crisis, the economy may have been in crisis.
09. If the central bank regarded the economy in crisis, the economy
may have been in crisis.
10. If both domestic and international organisations monitoring
economic performance regarded the economy in crisis, then the
economy may have been in crisis.
11. If elected representatives regarded the economy in crisis, the
economy may have been in crisis.
12. If government pronouncements on the economy were consistent
with a crisis management approach, the economy may have been
in crisis.
The Mexican Economy in the Early 1980s
After 1945 Mexico sought growth through import substitution
(Narula 2002). Industries developed behind import quotas. This
increased the country’s international trade, decreasing its foreign
dependence. The model succeeded as there was demand for Mexican
raw materials. However, it created a private sector dependent upon state
protection (Hernández 2008).2)
President Echeverria’s (1970-1976) administration allowed fiscal and
monetary discipline collapse (Serra-Puche 2008),3) marking the exhaustion
of the policy of “stabilising development” (Narula 2002). Rubio (2008) 4)

2) Luis Miguel Beristain Hernández, PhD. in Administrative Sciences. Business and
Politics professor, Director of Professional Development, Enterprise Development and
Social Development at ITESM (Interviewed July 2008).
3) Jaime Serra Puche, PhD. in Economics. Mexican Politician. Secretary of Commerce
and Industry in 1988; Treasury Secretary in 1994; and Mexico’s representative in
NAFTA negotiations in early 1990s (Interviewed June 2008).
4) Luis Rubio, PhD. in Political Science. Mexican writer on politics, and economics
(Interviewed July 2008).
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blames the failures of stabilising development on falling agricultural exports,
rapid population growth, and middle class disillusionment with its inability
to express itself in a one party (Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI))
dominated culture. However, once oil reserves were discovered by
Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), the state oil company, in the late 1970s
(Calderón-Madrid 1997), the hope was that oil revenue would stabilise the
economy. However, this only circumvented the dangers of immediate crisis,
without resolving the economy’s structural problems (Nelson 1990, 95).
This was evidence of the temporary solutions often sought by Mexico’s
political elite (Tournaud 2008).5)
Once the country became a net petroleum exporter pressure grew to
expand public spending. The number of state owned enterprises
quadrupled to 1,200 (Calderón-Madrid 1997). Under President Portillo
(1976-1982) expenditure outstripped petroleum revenues and an
anaemic taxation system (Solís 1981). As a consequence, the economy
began to overheat (Appendix A). To finance these projects Mexico
borrowed $78bn. by 1981 (Alarcon and McKinley 1992). The state’s
share of fixed capital formation increased to 50 percent (Fitzgerald 1978,
277). As inflation surpassed 25 percent the peso became overvalued,
and the competiveness of exports, apart from oil, diminished
(McCaughan 1993). ‘The merchandise trade balance deteriorated’ as
‘imports rose while nonoil exports earning stagnated’ (Nash 1991, 494).
Mexico was poorly positioned when oil prices fell in response to a
weakening world economy in the early 1980s.6) Compounding matters,
PEMEX and the Secretaría de Programación y Presupuesto (SPP),
declared oil production would be insufficient to reactivate the economy.7)
Recession in the US reduced demand for Mexican goods, while a sharp
5) Nicolas Foucras Tournaud, PhD. in Political Science. Head of the Political Science
department, ITEMS (Instituto Tecnológico y De Estudios Superiores de Monterrey)
Campus Monterrey (Interviewed August 2008).
6) Time Magazine, 22 February, 1982.
7) Magazine Nexos, Sociedad, Ciencia y Literatura, January, 1982. “De Díaz Mirón a
Díaz Serrano”.
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increase in interest rates there reduced the money supply, and put
pressure on Mexico’s debt servicing, as US banks had lent the country
$25 billion. Servicing Mexico’s debt reached $16 billion, more than its
revenues from oil (Cornelius 1985, 89). ‘Collapsing oil prices and rising
international interest rates erased Mexico’s prosperity’ (Starr 2006, 53).
By 1982, as confidence in the economy waned, Mexicans began
converting pesos to dollars at 25 billion pesos a day.8) The gravity of the
situation came to international attention on August 13, 1982, when:
The government fired the shot heard around the world,
announcing that it could not meet interest payments coming due
within the next few days and initiating negotiations for bridge
loans and rescheduling agreements with the US Treasury, the
IMF, and the private commercial banks (Nelson 1990, 97).

Mexico’s economic indicators pointed towards crisis (Appendix A)
(Dornbusch and Edwards 1991). GDP contracted by 0.6 percent in 1982
and 4.2 percent in 1983, while the inflation reached 58.92 percent in
1982 (Katz 1994). Output fell in all industries,9) unemployment jumped
towards 15 percent,10) while more than 20 million people, half the
workforce, were underemployed (Cornelius 1985, 92). Compounding
matters, US banks stopped lending to Mexican companies as they
already owed US$600 million in interest.11) The budget deficit stood at
16.5 percent of GDP.12)
In 1983 inflation reached triple digits, the national debt continued to
rise, and the level of capital formation slackened (Appendix A).
According to Edwards (1995, 17) this was the worst crisis to hit Mexico
since the Great Depression. The Third World Magazine,13) Gestión y
8) Time Magazine, 30 August, 1982.
9) ibid.
10) ibid., 20 December, 1982.
11) ibid., 1 January, 1983.
12) ibid., 20 December, 1982.
13) The Third World Magazine, October, 1983. “IMF: quick fix- slow poison”.
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Estrategia,14) and Time Magazine15) referred to Mexico’s difficulties as
a crisis. Mexican economic magazine Proceso regarded 1982 as
Mexico’s worst recession.16) The Third World Magazine argued the
country was effectively bankrupt.17) Minimum wages were insufficient
to meet the needs of most Mexicans (Lustig 1986). Opinion polls found
great scepticism concerning the economy (Basañez 1985).
During 1982 the peso was devaluated twice in order to increase
exports (Katz 1994), but the economy could not hold onto dollars. New
short term loans were taken to counteract capital flight, but did nothing
(Jiménez 2006). Banco de México’s reserves dried up in a matter of
weeks.18) In his Sixth Annual Presidential Report, Portillo stated that the
economy was experiencing the worst crisis in its history.19)
Bailey (1980, 54) identified trends that produced economic panic:
excessive government outlays; $15 billion in short-term loans which
funded capital flight; an overvalued peso; and dollarization. Despite
growing by 8 percent annually between 1978 and 1981, by the end of
1982, Mexico faced one of the severest crises in its history (Barker and
Brailovsky 1983).
The Brazilian Economy in the Late 1990s
Brazil undertook an inflation stabilization programme in 1994, the Plano
Real (Netto 1999), pegging the real to the dollar. Inflation fell from 50
percent per month in 1995 to 3.2 percent annually by 1998 (Appendix B).
However, there was substantial exchange rate appreciation, making Brazilian
goods relatively more expensive, contributing to a current account deficit by
1997 (Bulmer-Thomas 1999, 730).
14) Gestión y Estrategia, Calderón, Gilberto, July, 1991. “Privatización de la Banca en México”.
15) Time Magazine, 15 July, 1987. “Last Bow of the Inflation Tamer”.
16) Proceso(1982), Mexican economic and political magazine, “La Devaluación de 1982,”
No. 306, September 11.
17) The Third World Magazine, December, 1983.
18) Latin America Regional Reports, 13 August, 1982, p. 1.
19) Sixth Annual Presidential Report of President López Portillo, September 1, 1982.
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Interest rates doubled as the repercussions from the Asian financial
crisis reached Brazil, indicating the fragility of its situation (Heymann
2001, 16). Simultaneously, inflation began to rise, reaching 5 percent by
1999. Nevertheless, the authorities promised a new assault on fiscal
problems, now aggravated by higher interest on government debt.
However, the government, with an eye to the 1998 elections, failed to
make good on its commitments, and the budget deficit grew to 8.4
percent of GDP.
Following the Asian crisis, and Russian bond default, investors
became risk averse (Kaminsky et al. 2003, 51), reflecting the downgrading
of Brazil’s credit rating.20) As $30 billion fled the country in September
1998, the central bank raised interest rates to 43 percent. By November
President Cardoso, safely re-elected, announced measures to slash the
deficit, and right the economy.21)
However, the real came under speculative attack in November 1998.
To defend the currency, the central bank pushed interest rates to 50
percent,22) increasing the cost of servicing public and private debt to the
extent that investors became convinced a default was inevitable. High
interest rates, instead of slowing the tide of dollars leaving Brazil,
accelerated the process. The governor of Minas Gerais’s announcement
of a 90 day moratorium on debt repayments to the federal government,23)
and fears that the governors of Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul
would do likewise, threatened the country’s fiscal integrity (Rothkopf
1999, 91), sending investors fleeing the Brazilian capital markets
(Cattaneo 2001, 228). With the Brazilian central bank losing $2 billion a
day,24) the World Bank initiated crisis talks.

20) Brazil’s rating in 1999; Moody: B2, S&P: -B; Fitch: -BB. See Moody’s Investor’s
Service; Standard & Poor’s; Fitch IBCA; at http://www.latin-focus.com/latinfocus/
countries/brazil.
21) The Economist, 21 November, 1998, p. 23.
22) The Independent, 4 December, 1999, p. 18.
23) Business and Finance, 25 January, 1999, p. 36.
24) The Evening Standard, 15 January, 1999, p. 41.
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A $41 billion IMF-led rescue package was arranged.25) But, President
Cardoso was unable to get an appropriate budget (tax increases/spending
cuts) approved.26) The possibility of default arose. The upper classes,
convinced devaluation of the real inevitable, began withdrawing
investment from Brazil. The fall in gross capital formation for 1998
reflected this capital flight (Table 2). As foreign direct investment (FDI)
went elsewhere the prospects for the economy, and the value of the real,
grew bleak. Unemployment hit 9 percent by the end of 1998.
Despite pledges not to do so,27) the exchange rate band was widened
to accommodate devaluation in January 1999 (Roett and Crandall 1999,
279). While the real/dollar exchange rate, which had been close to
parity, plummeted to two for one by February. Debt services as a
percentage of exports reached 117 percent by 1999.28) Devaluation also
put pressure on the central bank as its diminishing foreign currency
reserves were the only thing preventing further devaluation.29) However,
devaluation did not stop the haemorrhage of dollars.
On the day of devaluation, the Sao Paulo stock exchange fell 10
percent and within a few weeks this policy collapsed, forcing the
resignation of a second central bank governor. Arminio Fraga, the new
governor, floated the currency,30) but the country plunged into recession
with declines in industrial output and GNP.31) The percentage of the
population below the poverty line surpassed 25 percent.32) The New York
Times –observing that Brazil was in crisis, with capital fleeing, and state
governments defying the central authority33)– predicted a debt default.34)

25) ibid., 30 January, 1999, p. S12.
26) The New York Times, 28 February, 1999, p. 1.
27) The Washington Post, 11 February, 1999, p. A31.
28) The Independent, 14 January, 1999, p. 1.
29) The Daily Mail, 15 January, 1999, p. 65.
30) Financial Times, 4 March, 1999, p. 6.
31) Business and Finance, 19 August, 1999, p. 10.
32) Brazil, http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=br&v=69
33) The New York Times, 31 January, 1999, p. 16.
34) ibid., 31 January, 1999, p. 16.
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Real GDP was stagnant throughout 1998 and 1999 (Appendix B), while
GDP per capita fell by 1.39 and 0.7 percent in the same period.35)
However, the inflation did not surpass 7 percent.36)
‘Many commentators assumed Brazil would have to restructure its
debt (a euphemism for default)’ (Bulmer-Thomas 1999, 736). Summers
(2000, 5) regarded this as one of the major international financial crises
of the 1990s. By early March 1999 the Brazilian central bank was still
struggling to prop up the real.37) According to Summers and Williamson
(2001, 56) at the heart of the Brazilian crisis was that its pegged
exchange rate lacking sufficient institutionalisation of the measures
necessary to make the peg stick.
<Table 1> The Identification of Macroeconomic Crisis

The Observable Implications

Mexico
19811983

Brazil
19992003

01. Was GDP growth was stagnant?

X

02. Was total debt as a percentage of GNI was above 100%?

X

03. Was annual inflation was above 15%?

X

04. Was the annual interest rate was above 15%?

X

05. Was the annual unemployment rate was above 15%?

X

06. Did opinion polls find the public regarded the economic
in crisis?

X

X

07. Did the media regard the economy in crisis?

X

X

08. Did economic and political commentators regard the
economy in crisis?

X

X

09. Did the central bank regard the economy as in crisis?

X

X

10. Did domestic/international organisations regard the
economy as in crisis?

X

X

35) Data Gob, Governance Indicators Database, http://www.iadb.org/DataGob/
36) The Economic Intelligence Unit - Country Report, Brazil, March, 2003.
37) The Times, 3 March, 1999, p. 12.

X

X
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11. Did elected representatives regard the economy as in
crisis?

X

X

12. Were gov pronouncements on the economy were
consistent with a crisis management approach?

X

X

Economic Crisis

X

X

According to the framework Mexico experienced a macroeconomic
crisis, as it satisfied all observable implications (Table 1). The economy
was stagnant, debt out of control, inflation and interest rates very high,
and the general perception amongst politicians, economic commentators,
and the media, was of crisis. Although Brazil (1998-2000) satisfied only
70 percent of the observables (Table 1), we argue that it experienced an
economic crisis. This is because its economy was stagnant, investment
was declining, and the media, public, and economic commentators,
regarded the economy in a crisis.
In terms of severity, Mexico’s crisis was more acute than Brazil’s.
This is clear from developments in Mexico at the time, and is also borne
out by all of the above observables pointed to a crisis there. Thus,
although both states experienced economic crises during the years in
question, their severity differed. Holding with Hogan and Doyle’s (2007;
2008) critical juncture framework, which argues that a crisis induced
consolidation of a new idea –replacing an extant idea– can lead to
significant policy change, the next section will see if ideas underlying
the economic policies in both states changed at these times.
Ⅳ.2. Testing for Ideational Change
Previous policies can be discredited due to their implication in, or
inability to right, a crisis (Levy 1994). Although economic crises can
have great impact they will not determine policy, whose formulation is
‘centred in domestic political and ideational processes’ (Golob 2003,
375). Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) framework contends that
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significant policy change depends upon actors reaching consensus upon,
and consolidating around, a new set of ideas. This corresponds to
McNamara’s (1998, 4-5) argument that actors utilize new ideas to chart
policy strategy. ‘Ideas facilitate the reduction of […] barriers by acting
as coalition-building resources among agents who attempt to resolve the
crisis’ (Blyth 2002, 37). Ideas are the casual mechanisms of change in a
critical juncture (Golob 2003). Thus, ideational change stands between a
crisis and policy change.
Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) framework contends that new ideas
are introduced by three groups of change agents. Combinations of these
agents constitute a policy network (Hall 1993). The most important are
what Dahl (1961) termed ‘political entrepreneurs’. Political entrepreneurs
‘exploit moments of instability’ and ‘invest resources in the creation of a
new policy, a new agency, or new forms of collective action’ (Sheingate
2003, 188-190). In a crisis, a political leader, usually an opposition
leader, will seek new ideas to rectify the ills of an existing policy
paradigm. The second group are Kingdon’s (1995, 179-183) ‘policy
entrepreneurs’. These are agents who spread ideas to replace the current
paradigm. They may be civil servants, technocrats, academics, economists
and interest groups. The final group of change agents consists of outside
influences: the media, the OECD, IMF and the World Bank. They
critique an existing economic paradigm, advocating a new one. Both
policy entrepreneurs and outside influences are responsible for
producing ideas, but, political entrepreneurs introduce ideas into the
policy process.
According to Legro’s (2000, 419) two-stage model of ideational
change, if agents agree the existing paradigm is deficient and should be
replaced, the first stage –ideational collapse– has occurred. These are the
observables for ideational collapse:
Ideational Collapse
01. The media questions the efficacy of the current model.
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02. Opposition political parties critique the current model and propose
alternative ideas –at election time their platform will be built around
these alternatives.
03. Civil society organizations, e.g. labour unions, employer organizations,
consumer groups etc. critique the current model.
04. Widespread public dissatisfaction with the current paradigm, observable
through opinion polls, protests etc.
05. External/international organizations critique the current model
and/or actively disseminate alternative ideas.
Change agents in the form of policy entrepreneurs, and outside
influences, propose a solutions. However, ‘even when ideational
collapse occurs, failure to reach consensus on a replacement could still
produce continuity, as society reflexively re-embraces the old orthodoxy’
(Legro 2000, 424). The crucial issue is reaching consensus on a new set
of ideas. If consensus is achieved it marks the second stage of Legro’s
model –consolidation– agents coordinating a replacement set of ideas.
This can be seen in political entrepreneurs consolidating innovations by
combining a mixture of interests to produce a winning coalition
(Sheingate 2003, 192-193). Oliver and Pemberton (2004) identified this
process as “policy learning”. Below are the observables for new
ideational consolidation.
New Ideational Consolidation
06. Clear alternative ideas, developed by policy entrepreneurs, are
evident.
07. A clear change agent (political entrepreneur) injecting new ideas
into the policy arena is evident.
08. The Political Entrepreneur combines a mixture of interests to
produce consensus around a replacement paradigm.
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Policies are protected by underlying ideas. The greater the consensus
encompassing an idea the more protected the policies derived from it.
Protected policies represent continuity, whereby once a policy has
become institutionally embedded, ‘policy-making becomes possible
only in terms of these ideas’ (Blyth 2001, 4). Referring to policies as
protected is similar to Golob’s notion of ‘policy frontiers’ (2003, 363).
The Ideas Underlying Mexican Macroeconomic Policy
Populist-redistributive models were implemented by PRI presidents
between 1934 and 1976 (Sandersen 1983, 319). When Portillo came to
office he was forced to contemplate reduced expenditure due to the oil
crisis (Woodhead 1980). However, the discovery of oil changed
everything, with Portillo adopting a patronage model embracing
industrialisation and expansive state expenditure (Bailey 1980). This
produced high growth, however, the economy remained vulnerable.
Rather than pay the political price that sweeping redistributive
policies-especially tax reform-would have entailed, the Portillo
administration (1976-1982) sought to expand the entire
economic pie and increase the role of the state in the economy,
as banker, entrepreneur, and employer (Cornelius 1985, 88).

Despite oil revenues, the economy became fuelled on borrowing and
declining real wages.38) However, once oil prices fell, and interest rates
spiked, Mexico faced the prospect of debt default. The ideas underlying
extant economic policy underwent a rethink. By mid March 1982,
President Portillo’s administration introduced an economic stabilization
plan.39)
During the 1982 presidential election all contenders focused on the
crisis. Miguel De La Madrid, a fiscal conservative, was the PRI’s
38) The Times, 10 September, 1982.
39) Time Magazine, 29 March, 1982.
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presidential candidate.40) He was ‘among the leaders of the conservative
faction based in the treasury’ (Nelson 1990, 98). Shifts in a more
conservative direction within the PRI led to De La Madrid’s selection
(Villegas 1981). Mexican society was in turmoil, and free market
supporters wanted a president who would support the rights of private
property (Luna et al. 1987). The choice of De La Madrid constituted a
rupture with the PRI’s revolutionary ideology (Cárdenas 2008).41)
During the campaign, De La Madrid stressed the differences between
his proposed government and that of Portillo. “Crises come about
because the government tries to consolidate all interests at the same time
[...]” declared De La Madrid.42) His proposed government would
mobilise resources to change the economy’s direction.43) ‘In the post1982 environment, policy options and instruments appeared limited [for
Mexico], which as a debtor was subject to the conditionality imposed by
the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’ (Golob 2003, 375).
In his inauguration address De La Madrid declared that a new
economic approach was needed.44) Sources of external finance dried up
in the aftermath of the crisis, while oil revenues remained stagnant
(Hernández 2008). Locked into a harsh IMF bailout, negotiated by the
outgoing administration, De La Madrid presented a programme for
policy change.45) To maintain economic, political, and social order, a
break with the past was required. Acting as a political entrepreneur, De
La Madrid selected his ministers from the conservative wing of the PRI
(Nelson 1990, 98). He wanted to take policy to the right, stabilizing and
opening the economy (Lustig 1992, 28). The new administration

40) ibid., 5 October, 1981.
41) Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. Mexican politician, active in Mexican politics in the 1980s
and important political representative of Mexico’s opposition parties (Partido de la
Revolución Democrática [PRD]).
42) Latin America Regional Reports, 4 June, 1982, pp. 1-2.
43) ibid.
44) First Annual Presidential Report of President Miguel De La Madrid, 1September, 1983.
45) La Devaluación, 11 September, 1982, No. 306.
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prioritized integration into the world economy by attracting FDI; and
focusing on high tech industries.
The Ideas Underlying Brazilian Macroeconomic Policy
The state played an important role in Brazil’s development (Goldstein
1999, 675). After the first oil crisis the Geisel administration
implemented an expansionary growth strategy (Pinheiro and Giambiagi
1999, 7). However, the rising nation debt burdened the economy, and as
interest rates rose servicing this debt became problematic (Baer 2001).
GDP growth stagnated to 1.2 percent per annum during the 1980s (Berg
et al. 2006, 46). After a half century of import-substitution industrialisation
the economy was opened in 1990 under President Collor (Berg et al.
2006, 49).
The 2002 election saw widespread discontent with the market model
due to the Real Crisis and persistent indigence (Samuels 2006). Luiz
Inácio Lula de Silva and the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) initially
contested the election attacking the market-friendly policies of Cardoso.
The PT’s program for government, Concepção e Diretrizes do Programa
de Governo do PT para o Brasil emphasized state intervention and
poverty reduction.46) Public opinion echoed these sentiments.47)
Following market jitters concerning statist policies, Lula announced
he would not reverse capitalist reforms, but would seek to make them
fairer.48) Market fears were exacerbated by the meltdown of the
Argentine economy, and worries that Brazil might also default.49)
Investor anxiousness sent the value of the Real tumbling again.50) In

46) Concepção e Diretrizes do Programa de Governo do PT para o Brasil, Partido dos
Trabalhadores(2002), São Paulo.
47) Latinobarómetro(2003), Informe Resumen: La Democracia y la Economía -available
at http://www.latinobarometro.org/fileadmin/documentos/prensa/Espanol/2003.pdf
48) Time Magazine, 19 August, 2002.
49) ibid.
50) ibid., 2 December, 2002.
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response, the PT released a toned down Programa de Governo do PT.51)
Just before the election, to assuage investors confidence, Lula released
Carta ao Povo Brasileiro (Letter to the People of Brazil). It stated that
he was not going to implement the leftist ideology of the PT if elected
(Flynn 2005, 1246). It suggested he would seek to ensure economic
stability, and did not criticize free market policies.52) Lula was cognisant
of his impact upon the market, and ‘that economic autarchy [was] not an
option for an export-driven economic powerhouse’.53) He recognised
that a program that might result in default would make it difficult for
him to implement his social policies.54)
Ideational contestation occurred, but Lula failed to present an
alternative to an open economy. Recognising economic realities, he
moderated his rhetoric, and moved to the right.55) Closing the economy,
and renationalizing firms, would scare investor (Weyland 2004, 144).
Throughout the campaign Lula sought to ‘reassure foreign investors and
financial markets that he [was] not a reckless Marxist firebrand’.56) His
only sop to the past was to call for an end to outright privatisations
(unremarkable, as little was left to sell). Lula came to recognise the need
for growth within the context of the extant economic regime, in order to
achieve his social agenda.57) No alternative idea to the open economy
was consolidated.

51) Programa de Governo do PT, A Herança Social, Partido dos Trabalhadores(2002),
São Paulo, parágrafos 21 & 22.
52) Carta ao Povo Brasileiro, Partido dos Trabalhadores(2002), São Paulo.
53) Time Magazine, 4 October, 2002.
54) ibid.
55) The Washington Times, 24 November, 2002, p. 2.
56) The New York Times, 30 October, 2002, p. 26.
57) The Washington Post, 6 November, 2002, p. 1.
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<Table 2> The Identification of Ideational Change

The Observable Implications
Ideational Collapse
01. Media questioning efficacy of current model.
02. Opposition parties critique current model and propose
alternative ideas - at elections their platform are built around
these alternative ideas.
03. Civil society organisations critique the current model.
04. Widespread public dissatisfaction with current paradigm,
observable through opinion polls, protests etc.
05. External or international organisations critique current
model or, actively disseminate alternative economic ideas.
New Ideational Consolidation
06. Clear alternative ideas are evident
07. A clear change agent (political entrepreneur) to inject these
new ideas into policy arena is evident
08. Political Entrepreneur combines a mixture of interests to
produce consensus around a replacement paradigm
Adoption of New Idea

Mexico
19811983

Brazil
19992003

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X
Y
X

Y

X
X
Y

N

In relation to Mexico, see from (Table 2) that all observable implications
concerning extant ideational collapse, and new consolidation, were
satisfied. Vast expenditure, based on the belief that oil revenues could
support rapid industrialisation, led the country to the brink of
bankruptcy. This resulted in widespread criticism of the economic
policy of import substitution, and as a result the ideas underpinning it
collapsed. De La Madrid, acting as a political entrepreneur, championed
a new set of ideas on opening the economy.
For Brazil, we see from (Table 2) that three of the observable
implications concerning ideational collapse were satisfied, while no
observable for new ideational consolidation was. Although the free
market model was challenged in Brazil, no viable alternative was
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presented. Lula’s opposition to economic openness mellowed as he
came to recognise that turning his back on international finance/markets
would make it impossible to achieve his social policies.
Thus, although both countries experienced economic crises, only in
Mexico did the ideas on how to manage the economy change. There,
changes agents, led by a political entrepreneur in De La Madrid,
consolidated around a replacement set of idea. In Brazil, a political
entrepreneur, willing to take policy in a new direction, was absent.
Next we examine both countries for changes in economic policy.
Based on the results so far, Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) framework
leads us to anticipate finding radical economic policy change in Mexico,
due to ideational change, but not in Brazil, due to the absence of
ideational change.
Ⅳ.3. Identification of Policy Change
McNamara (1998) argues that new ideas change the wider policy
environment. The level of policy change depends upon the preceding
variables, but is also central to determining if there was a critical
juncture. Based on Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) framework we
hypothesise that once there is political entrepreneur led consolidation
around a new set of ideas policy change should follow. The observable
implications are based upon Hall’s (1993) concepts of first, second, and
third order change. Hall (1993, 291) argued that exogenous shocks, and
policy failures, discredit the old paradigm, leading to a re-examination
of the belief systems through which that policy was created –a
paradigmatic, or third order, change. The observables set out below
enable us identify, and differentiate, normal and fundamental shifts in
policy. They also incorporate the notion of swift and enduring change
(Hogan 2005).
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01. If economic policy instrument settings changed (swiftly and for
longer than one government’s term of office) there may have
been a radical change in government economic policy.
02. If the instruments of economic policy changed (swiftly and for
longer than one government’s term of office) there may have
been a radical change in government economic policy.
03. If the hierarchy of goals behind economic policy changed (swiftly
and for longer than one government’s term of office) there may
have been a radical change in government economic policy.
Mexican Economic Policy
The first policy response to the crisis, from Portillo’s administration,
sought to keep domestic interest rates competitive (Looney 1985, 112),
while incentivising exports. For decades free trade was ‘the policy
option that dare not speak its name’ (Golob 2003, 370). In his inaugural
address in December 198258) De La Madrid outlined an austerity
program –Programa Inmediato de Reordenación Económica (Lustig
1998, 29). He sent a draconian budget to Congress,59) while the budgets
of 1982-1984 represented sustained austerity (Cornelius 1985, 117).
The ideas underlying state-led development, based on import
substitution industrialisation collapsed. The government ‘embraced an
approach toward liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation’ (Pastor
and Wise 1997, 421). These policies had a significant impact upon
Mexico’s economic, and social, development (Cornelius 1985, 84). The
new approach to the economy focused on using international forces as
promoters of liberalisation (Middlebrook 2004). However, a major
concern was Mexico’s inability to compete in foreign markets, and its
inadequate level of saving.60) De La Madrid’s administration signalled
its desire for new FDI by relaxing restrictive FDI laws (Cornelius 1985,
58) ibid.
59) ibid.
60) Latin America Regional Reports, 4 June, 1982, pp. 1-2.
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115), permitting Mexican businesses form international partnerships
(Tournaud 2008).
De La Madrid pegged the peso at a more “realistic” exchange rate,
and introduced plans to restructure the bureaucracy. He implemented
conventional monetary and fiscal austerity, more extensive trade
liberalisation, and a less confrontational approach to the IMF (Nelson
1990, 63). ‘Acceptance of the IMF embrace [was] a major breakthrough’ (ISG 1982, 1720), as it permitted Mexico avoid a debt
moratorium (Looney 1985, 121). The initial adjustment package sought
to ameliorate external debt through a reduction of government spending
and devaluation. This enabled Mexico reach its IMF targets for reducing
the public sector deficit, unfortunately it had a severe recessionary
impact (Pastor and Wise 1997, 421).
De La Madrid recognised that his administration could not rely on oil
exports.61) The solution to financing development was sought through
privatising public enterprises, of which 1,155 were sold off (Hernández
2008). De La Madrid sought to combine macroeconomic stabilisation
and structural change, with a focus on export orientated manufacturing
(Cornelius 1985, 110). This was part of the objective of integrating
Mexico into the world economy.
The relationship between the private sector and the state transformed
(Middlebrook 2004). The neoliberal reforms made the private sector a
key player in reviving the economy (Beristain 2008; Tournaud 2008).
Business organisations became engaged in debates over economic
policy, where previously the private sector had been kept at a distance
(Golob 2003, 371).
De La Madrid’s approach focused on development with a social
objective, but based upon economic reality.62) Reform changed the
country’s social ideology (Hernández 2008; Rubio 2008). Thus,
Mexican economic history can be divided into before, and after, 1982
61) The Third World Magazine, December, 1983, p. 72.
62) Latin America Regional Reports, 4 June, 1982, pp. 1-2.
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(Cárdenas 2008; Serra-Puche 2008). Mexico started down a different
path under De La Madrid. In the wake of economic crisis, and change in
the ideas underlying economic policy, Mexico experienced a third-order
macroeconomic policy change. The market replaced regulation, private
ownership replaced public ownership, and competition replaced
protectionism (Pastor and Wise 1997, 421).
Brazilian Economic Policy
Prior to his inauguration investors were concerned that Lula would be
unable to manage the 9th largest economy in the world, and that his
policies would be dominated by PT ideology (Flynn 2005, 1245). They
also feared a debt default, as in Argentina. When Lula assumed office in
January 2003 his appointment of Antonio Palocci, who had privatised
utilities during the 1990s, as finance minister, and Henrique Meirelles, a
free market economist, as head of the Central Bank, signalled his
economic intentions.63) His economic staff was made up of those who
had abandoned the populist ideas of the PT (de Castro and de Carvalho
2003, 484). Palocci assured investors that the new government would
pursue fiscal restraint, low inflation and an open market.64)
This assuaged fears of a lurch to the left (Edwards 2007, 74). The PT
government, abandoning radicalism, maintained the free market, and
budgetary stability, of its predecessors. It kept a grip on the money
supply and implemented severe spending cuts.65) By not taking the
economy in a new direction, but working within established frameworks,
financial markets gained confidence (Edwards 2007, 73).
Instead of revising Brazilian macroeconomic policy the PT reversed
its own position, as signalled in the Carta ao Povo Brasileiro. Some saw
this adoption of the economic program of the outgoing Cardoso
administration as betrayal of the ideals upon which the PT was founded
63) Time Magazine, 2 March, 2003.
64) O Estado de São Paulo, 18 December, 2002, p. 18.
65) New York Times, 10 April, 2003, p. 10.
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(Bourne 2008, 153). Radicalism was replaced with an orthodox
approach to economic management. Nevertheless, improved the
exchange rate, and reduced the risks associated with Brazilian
government bonds. The economy responded, growing by 5 percent in
2004, up from 0.5 percent in 2003 (Flynn 2005, 1223), and it began to
run a current account surplus.
The president established a number of high profile posts on social
policy, to help the poor (de Castro and de Carvalho 2003, 484). Lula,
through medidas provisória (provisional decree) 144/03, ensured the
state electricity company, Eltrobras, and its subsidiaries Eletronorte,
Chesf, Furnas and Eletrosul would be exempt from the Programa
Nacional de Desestatização (The National Program of Destatisation:
PND), created under Collor.66) However, José Dirceu, PT Chief of Staff,
assured the markets that the government would not re-nationalise
companies.67) Nevertheless, there was surprise in November 2003, when
the privatization of state banks, which Lula had opposed while waiting
to assume office, proceeded.68) To encourage foreign investment, Lula
unveiled plans for public-private partnerships. Private firms could invest
in state enterprises, which largely conformed with President Collor’s
PND.
By the end of Lula’s first term, it was clear his economic policies
were a continuation of his predecessor’s. Acceptance of a disciplined
approach to the economy gained him the support of previously wary
investors.69) The instrument settings of economic policy may have
changed, but the instruments and hierarchy of goals underling economic
policy remain the same. What changed was ‘the PT’s programmatic
trajectory: the support for the financial economic sector, previously so
harshly criticized’ (Bianchi and Braga 2005, 1761).

66) Latin America News Digest, 30 January, 2004.
67) World Markets Analysis, 16 June, 2003.
68) Gazeta Mercantil, 10 November, 2003.
69) The Washington Post, 6 November, 2002, p. 1.
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<Table 3> The Identification of Change in Government Economic Policy
The Observable Implications
01. If industrial policy instrument settings changed
there may have been a radical change in
economic policy
02. If the instruments of industrial policy changed
there may have been radical change in
economic policy
03. If the hierarchy of goals behind industrial policy
changed there may have been a radical change
in economic policy
Critical Juncture in Macroeconomic Policy

Mexico
1981-1983
X

Brazil
1999-2003
X

X

X

Y

N

In Mexico we identified an economic crisis and ideational change.
According to the framework, ideational change is the differentiating
factor between crises that lead to paradigmatic policy changes, and those
that do not. At the end of the previous section our indentifying
ideational change in Mexico led us to anticipate a third order change in
Mexican macroeconomic policy, which we identified in (Table 3).
According to Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) three stage framework,
the economic crisis, ideational change, and radical change in
privatisation policy constituted a critical juncture.
Although there was an economic crisis in Brazil, there was no
ideational change. The absence of ideational change led us to anticipate
the absence of radical policy change. This was confirmed in (Table 3).
The inability of Lula to champion an alternative set of economic idea
resulted in only a first-order change in economic policy. There was no
critical juncture in Brazilian macroeconomic policy.
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V. Conclusion
We examined two economic upheavals, Mexico (1981-1983) and
Brazil (1999-2003), to determine if there were critical junctures in their
economic policies. To answer this question we employed Hogan and
Doyle’s (2007; 2008) three stage framework for identifying critical
junctures. Our findings were a critical juncture in Mexican economic
policy, but relatively minor change in Brazilian economic policy.
According to the framework the economic malaise in Mexico (19811983) constituted an economic crisis. The ideational foundations of
extant economic policy collapsed in 1982, in the midst of this crisis.
Import substitution and the restrictions imposed upon FDI were
perceived as failing. In this context, De La Madrid assumed the role of
political entrepreneur, fostering an alternative set of ideas on economic
management. Change agents, led by the political entrepreneur, consolidated
around the idea of opening the economy to free trade - a reversal of
previous policy. De La Madrid altered the setting, instruments, and
hierarchy of goals behind Mexican economic policy - third order policy
change. Thus, there was a crisis, ideational change, and radical change
in economic policy, what the framework rates a critical juncture.
The framework also identified an economic crisis in the Brazilian
economy (1999-2003). Although ideational collapse occurred, Lula, the
likely candidate to fulfil the role of political entrepreneur, declined the
opportunity to champion change agents’ alternative ideas on managing
the economy. Consequently, a coherent policy alternative was not
injected into the policy making environment. Instead, Lula, and his party,
performed a u-turn, accepting the market friendly ideas of the outgoing
Cardoso administration, which they had previously criticised. In the
absence of ideational change there was only a first order change in
Brazilian economic policy.
Hogan and Doyle’s framework provided valuable insights into the
policy change processes in both countries. As the framework possesses a
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level of rigor the results it produced are comparable, though the cases
examined are from different countries in different decades. By situating
the cases in a comparative context, the framework permits us to see how
changes in economic policy arise. The significance of employing this
framework is that make the identification of what is, and what is not, a
critical junctures more straightforward. The early 1980s witnessed a
dramatic shift in Mexican economic policy, this in the wake of
economic crisis, collapse of the ideas underlying protectionism, and
consolidation of a new set of economic ideas under political entrepreneur
De La Madrid. In Brazil, 20 years later, the absence of a political
entrepreneur, despite an economic crisis, ensured that an alternative set
of economic ideas was not consolidated, leaving the foundations of
extant policy intact. The economic policy changes, instituted by De La
Madrid, served as a cornerstone for Mexican economic policy going
forward.

Appendix
<Appendix A> Mexico’s Economic Indicators, 1977-1983
Year

Unemply
(%)

Inflation
(%)
29

Government
Debt to
GNI ratio
39.18

Growth
Rates in Real
GDP
3.38

Gross Capital
Formation %
of GDP
22.84

1977

8.8

1978

6.9

17.45

35.86

8.96

23.6

1979

5.7

18.17

32.79

9.69

25.95

1980

4.2

26.36

30.53

9.22

25.73

1981

4.2

27.93

32.59

8.77

25.94

1982

6.8

58.92

53.3

-0.63

21.56

1983

6.9

101.7

66.53

-4.2

19.77

Source: Data Gob. [WWW document]. http://www.iadb.org/DataGob/index.html Mitchell, R.
B.(2007), International Historical Statistics: The Americas 1750-2005. 6th ed.,
Macmillan: Basingstoke; Fleck, S. and C. Sorrentino(1994), “Employment and
Unemployment in Mexico’s Labour force,” Monthly Labour Review, November (3).
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<Appendix B> Brazil’s Economic Indicators, 1997-2003
Year

Unemply
(%)

Inflation
(%)

Government Debt
to GNI ratio

Growth Rates
in Real GDP

Gross Capital
Formation % of GDP

1997

7.8

6.9

25.0

3.3

21.5

1998

9.0

3.2

31.4

0.1

21.1

1999

9.6

4.8

47.3

0.8

20.4

2000

12

7

41.7

4

21.5

2001

9.4

6.84

47.2

1.31

21.2

2002

10.8

8.45

52.6

1.93

19.9

2003

9.7

14.7

48.4

0.5

17.3

Source: Data Gob. [WWW document]. http://www.iadb.org/DataGob/index.html Mitchell, R.
B.(2007), International Historical Statistics: The Americas 1750-2005, 6th ed.,
Macmillan: Basingstoke.
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This paper utilises a new critical juncture framework to help us
determine whether changes to Mexican macroeconomic policy in the
early 1980s, and Brazilian macroeconomic policy at the turn of the
century, were clean breaks with the past, or continuations of previously
established policy pathways. The framework consists of three elements,
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